InfluenceMap analysis shows how corporate lobbying has sought to dismiss concerns about carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies and weaken implementation standards under the Paris Agreement's Crediting Mechanism (Article 6.4). This lobbying—targeted at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which will manage the crediting mechanism—is led by companies including Drax, Oxy, and Microsoft, alongside industry associations such as the International Emissions Trading Association, the Carbon Capture and Storage Association, the Global CCS Institute, and the International Energy Agency Greenhouse Gas Program. These actors have pushed to weaken safeguards for CDR technologies, including DACCS (direct air capture with carbon capture and storage) and BECCS (bioenergy with CCS), and dilute durability and reversal standards.
Carbon markets are systems for trading carbon credits, where credits represent a unit of greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction or removal from the atmosphere, primarily carbon dioxide. In the context of climate mitigation, carbon markets help to bridge gaps in climate investments between countries by generating resources to finance activities that benefit climate action and promote sustainable development. In recent years, reports of mistrust and poor-quality carbon credits have undermined the credibility of voluntary carbon markets, with many found to have weak methodologies and standards, inadequate regulation, and overstated emissions reductions (1,2,3,4). In this context, the Paris Agreement’s Crediting Mechanism (Article 6.4)—which seeks to establish a standardized, compliance-driven global framework for carbon markets under the UN—will have global ramifications for how carbon markets contribute to mitigating climate change.
At COP26 in 2021, governments laid the groundwork for carbon markets and established the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body to create and operationalize a mechanism for trading carbon credits—the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism. It aimed to ensure that credits remain credible and durable so they can meaningfully contribute to climate mitigation. Since then, the inclusion of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) credits has emerged as a contentious topic in Article 6.4 negotiations. As there is currently no global consensus on implementation standards for many newer CDR technologies, vested interests are seizing the opportunity to influence their development.
Since 2022, the Supervisory Body has launched over 50 public consultations to develop methodologies for Article 6.4, which have invited significant corporate engagement on CDR. InfluenceMap has assessed 50+ corporate responses, spanning 50 consultations, from entities currently on the LobbyMap database and a few other significant groups. The research finds that, in their consultation responses, industry interests—including oil and gas entities with records of obstructive climate policy advocacy—consistently downplay CDR's uncertainties and limitations to promote recommendations that may not be fully science-informed.
Once finalized, Article 6.4 will be one of the first codified governance standards for CDR. If the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) incorporates potentially inadequate industry-proposed frameworks, it could have worldwide ramifications for how governments develop CDR policy and integrate it into their climate mitigation plans.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) 2022 Mitigation of Climate Change report defines CDR as activities that remove and sequester CO₂ from the atmosphere and durably store the carbon in geological, terrestrial, or ocean reservoirs, or in products. It identifies CDR as a "necessary element" to achieve net-zero emissions and to counterbalance residual emissions from hard-to-transition sectors, although it acknowledges that CDR's role is much smaller compared to conventional emissions reduction approaches. CDR approaches fall into two broad categories: land-based, primarily afforestation and reforestation, and technology-based, mainly bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS).
The IPCC identifies many risks and uncertainties associated with CDR, particularly with technology-based CDR approaches. The IPCC 2018 Special Report notes that “CDR deployed at scale is unproven, and reliance on such technology is a major risk in the ability to limit warming to 1.5°C.” The 2022 Mitigation of Climate Change report identifies the need for DACCS and BECCS in scenarios that limit warming to 2°C or lower by 2100 while simultaneously raising concerns about their readiness, costs, and real-world demonstration, as well as wider climate and sustainability implications. It further notes that CDR “cannot serve as a substitute for deep emissions reductions,”1 while broadly recommending substantial reductions in fossil fuel use as a key strategy to mitigate climate change.
InfluenceMap identified nine companies and six industry associations across its database that engaged with the UNFCCC’s consultation on CDR. Energy sector interests lead engagement on Article 6.4, with most pushing for CDR technologies that rely on carbon capture and storage (CCS), primarily direct air capture (DAC/DACCS) and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). Of these, many are consistent proponents of CCS for the energy sector, and several frequently promote fossil fuels in their broader climate policy advocacy.
Five of the seven entities with the most Article 6.4 consultation responses are companies or associations that promote CCS in the energy sector. This comprises multiple submissions (with the submission numbers listed in brackets) from groups that promote fossil-based CCS with major oil and gas companies as members, such as the Carbon Capture and Storage Association (CCSA) (4 responses), the Global CCS Institute (GCCSI) (4), and energy companies Drax (6) and Oxy (through its subsidiary 1PointFive) (3). The IEA Greenhouse Gas Programme (IEAGHG) (5)—an autonomous group that collaborates with the IEA and comprises members from governments and large energy companies, including Drax and Oxy—and the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) (19) were the other two largest respondents. The tech company Microsoft (3) also actively engaged with the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body.
Several groups that engaged on Article 6.4—including the American Petroleum Institute and Edison Electric Institute (EEI)—have historically taken obstructive, pro-fossil-fuel policy positions in their climate policy advocacy, according to InfluenceMap’s LobbyMap database. This suggests that such entities view permissive rules on carbon removal accreditation as a significant component of an overall strategy to prolong and expand the role of fossil fuels in the global energy mix.
Of all entities, the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA), which responded to 19 of the 51 relevant UNFCCC consultations in 2022–25, engaged most frequently. IETA represents businesses across sectors and describes itself as “committed to smart, well-designed and effective carbon markets” to support climate goals. It actively participates in the UNFCCC’s annual COP events, and the group’s COP28 hub featured events hosted by organizations noted for advocacy on Article 6.4—Oxy, Edison Electric Institute, CCSA, and Global CCS Institute—suggesting a coordinated campaign on carbon removal discussions at the UN level. Fossil fuel companies also attend UNFCCC events through IETA’s delegation: at COP30 in 2025, IETA’s 47 registered attendees included representatives from BP, ExxonMobil, PetroChina, and TotalEnergies, while its delegation to the 2024 Bonn Conference included Shell, Drax, and BP. On carbon market-related policies, IETA is actively engaged, including organizing a joint letter opposing California’s proposal to fine companies that offer offsets that are unlikely to be “quantifiable,” “real,” or “additional,” and engaging with EU carbon removal frameworks (1,2,3,4) in recent years.
The following graphic shows all the companies and industry associations that engaged with the UNFCCC on Article 6.4. The lines indicate corporate membership to the associations, and the size of the circles corresponds to the volume of submissions made to the Supervisory Body’s consultations.
The main findings of this briefing, set out in the subsequent sections, are driven from the assessment of the most engaged companies and their industry associations. Separately, engagement from companies ReNew and S&P Global focused on the technical aspects of the Article 6.4 registry design and are not covered here. Notable positions from less engaged companies Airbus, JP Morgan, GE Verona, Ørsted, and Schneider Electric are also referenced.
LobbyMap maintains the world's leading database on corporate and industry association climate policy engagement, with metrics and profiles covering 1000 companies and 330 industry associations. The companies are selected based on economic size and represent the vast majority in value of the universe of listed companies within a diversified, global portfolio.
The lines in the image indicate corporate memberships in the associations. The size of the circles corresponds to the number of instances of engagement, with larger circles indicating higher levels of engagement with the UNFCCC.
In 2023–24, the Supervisory Body concluded that “engineering-based removal activities,” including DACCS, BECCS, and enhanced weathering, “are technologically and economically unproven, especially at scale, and pose unknown environmental and social risks.” It noted that these activities have made limited contributions to removal so far—removing only 0.01 million tonnes of CO₂ (MtCO₂) per year compared to 2,000 MtCO₂ per year from land-based CDR. It added that “these activities do not contribute to sustainable development, are not suitable for implementation in the developing countries, and do not contribute to reducing the global mitigation costs, and therefore do not serve any of the objectives of the Article 6.4 mechanism.”
Industry actors dismissed the Supervisory Body’s concerns about these technologies, and in addition, many argued that DACCS and BECCS should be treated as proven technologies. CCSA, Drax, Edison Electric Institute, Microsoft, Oxy, JPMorgan & Chase, Global CCS Institute, IEA Greenhouse Gas Programme (IEAGHG) and Business Council for Sustainable Energy (BCSE)2 raised concerns with these assessments, particularly the portrayal of engineering-based removal activities as “technologically and economically unproven, especially at scale.” For example, Drax advocated for “concrete re-evaluation of the approach to BECCS,” and Oxy responded that the assessment is “not consistent with the current technical and commercial readiness of DAC”. IETA questioned the Supervisory Body’s mandate in making these assessments, and in another response, advocated against the Supervisory Body’s proposed option to limit Article 6.4 to only “transformative” activities that deliver “deep decarbonization” aligned with the IPCC. A joint submission from the International Air Transport Association and Airbus also insisted the Supervisory Body to explicitly include technology-based removals, mainly DACCS, in the mechanism.
Many industry groups pushed for “technology neutral” carbon removal standards in Article 6.4. In March 2023, IETA stated that the proposals on removals are “overly prescriptive” and advocated for “recommendations that are technology neutral.” In August and September 2023 comments, it also opposed the proposal to create a “negative list” of “unproven technologies” to prevent the lock-in of emissions-intensive projects. While pushing for technology neutrality, the American Petroleum Institute (API) also advocated against a separate UNFCCC-led carbon market and instead promoted collaboration and “global alignment” with existing voluntary carbon markets, suggesting a lack of support for UNFCCC’s compliance-based standards. Although “technology neutrality” is often presented as a reasonable, technocratic principle, InfluenceMap has documented how fossil fuel interests have repeatedly deployed this narrative to oppose science‑aligned climate policy, using it to create loopholes and weaken regulations in order to preserve polluting technologies. For example, the API used this argument to promote oil and gas expansion and weaken vehicle emissions standards in the US in 2025–26.
Energy sector interests pushed to adopt CO₂-emitting technologies as “removals” in direct contradiction to the IPCC guidance. GE Vernova's (formerly GE Power) response promoted point-source CCS in power generation as a potential engineering-based removal activity, potentially including fossil-based power plants. While Oxy’s responses did not directly reference fossil-adjacent uses, the company frequently promotes DACCS used in oil extraction as a “carbon removal” solution on its website and promotes oil and gas expansion in submissions to policymakers. In contrast, the IPCC clearly states that CCS “applied to CO₂ from fossil fuel use are not CDR methods as they do not remove CO₂ from the atmosphere.”3
Most industry responses to the UNFCCC on CDR appeared to push back against critical principles intended to ensure ambitious, meaningful, and science-based carbon removal standards.
Key industry entities advocated against proposed standards for durability and “reversals” in carbon storage, arguing that durability can be assumed for engineered carbon removals. The durability standards ensure that any CO₂ stored and credited under the mechanism remains sequestered from the atmosphere for a long time to deliver durable climate benefits, while the reversal standards manage the risk of leakage in stored CO₂. In 2023–24, IETA, Drax, CCSA, and Oxy advocated for reducing requirements for managing the risk of reversals. Drax initially opposed a mechanism to hold credits in reserve (a “buffer pool” mechanism) to account for reversals, but in a later response, it appeared to advocate a more stringent standard for assessing reversal risk. Oxy advocated against the durability proposal to ensure that stored CO₂ would be monitored for 45 years after verification. While IEAGHG did not criticize the proposed standards directly, it argued that the risk of reversals for CCS-based carbon storage was “very likely to be very low”. Global CCS Institute pushed to exclude the IPCC’s durability principle for CO₂ storage altogether by advocating for a weaker definition of CDR. In contrast to these positions, Schneider Electric advocated for ‘technology neutral’ permanence rules and to reduce the monitoring period, arguing that longer timeframes “would bar forests, agro-forestry and soil-carbon initiatives” and “divert capital toward costly engineered CDR.”
Industry did not support the Supervisory Body’s proposed criteria for biomass sources used in BECCS. In 2023, Drax (1,2) and Ørsted advocated against a proposal that qualified only biomass from dedicated purpose-grown feedstock (specifically raised for the purpose of producing fuel) as carbon removals. Drax pushed for the inclusion of “non-purpose grown feedstock,” while Orsted argued for biomass sourced from “sustainably managed forest areas” in BECCS to generate removals. While the IPCC remains uncertain about the environmental impacts of biomass production, which depend on factors such as scale of deployment, fuel displaced, and how the biomass is produced 4, newer reports also identify deforestation risks. For example, reports indicate that, in practice, the biomass Drax claimed as ‘sustainable’ for use in its power plant contributed to the deforestation of old-growth forests (1,2).
"A company that claims to be green and sustainable should want the strongest environmental protections possible. But here we see that Drax repeatedly lobbied against such protections. Given Drax’s track record this isn’t surprising, but it is shocking. Everywhere Drax goes, forests are put in danger."
In the assessed responses, no entity promoted a role for BECCS and DACCS in line with IPCC recommendations or acknowledged the risks and uncertainties associated with CCS technologies. These positions highlight a widespread industry push—dominated by the energy sector and CCS lobby groups—to weaken the definition of CDR in the UNFCCC’s framework, with the credibility of international carbon markets and their potential contribution to climate change mitigation at stake. With future consultations likely, there is a major opportunity for industry voices from across the economy to support stringent standards under the UNFCCC’s Article 6.4 that would ensure it can achieve the Paris Agreement’s goals.
1 IPCC Sixth Assessment Report, Working Group III, 2022, Mitigation of Climate Change, ‘Cross-sectoral Perspectives,' pg 1262.
2 InfluenceMap has not yet fully assessed the Global CCS Insitute, IEAGHG and BCSE.
3 IPCC Sixth Assessment Report, Working Group III, 2022, Mitigation of Climate Change, ‘Cross-sectoral Perspectives’, pg 1261.
4 Ibid., ‘Technical Summary,’ pg TS-47.
"What is particularly concerning is the imbalance in resources between industry actors and non-interested stakeholders such as civil society organisations, academics, and communities directly affected by carbon projects. Financially interested parties are able to mobilise a disproportionate number of responses compared to independent voices and, in the past, these efforts have unfortunately resulted in watering down of important rules. We hope to see that in the future a high volume of responses from a single interest group is not treated as representing the view held by the majority of stakeholders, and that stakeholders, especially those with their livelihoods at stake, are given at least equal weight to those with financial interests."
