This briefing provides an overview of corporate positioning on the EU Methane Regulation for the energy sector. It finds a growing misalignment in EU energy companies’ direct and indirect (via industry associations) advocacy, creating an increasingly one-sided policy dialogue which investors can address through targeted engagement.
Between 2021 and 2026, European energy companies, including BP, Eni, and Shell, have framed the EU Methane Regulation as a technical challenge, expressing conditional support for its objectives but calling for flexibility in implementation. By contrast, the industry associations that represent them, such as the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP) Europe, FuelsEurope, and Eurogas, characterize the regulation as a threat to energy security and competitiveness, and advocate for delay, dilution, and reopening the regulation under the EU’s simplification agenda. As seen above, InfluenceMap finds that this contrast is growing: energy companies appear to be reducing their public advocacy — despite maintaining voluntary, operational methane-reduction targets — while their trade groups are becoming increasingly vocal in opposing strong implementation of EU methane regulations.
In April 2022, the IPCC AR6 WGIII Report highlighted the key role of reducing methane emissions to stay within 1.5ºC of climate warming, with limited overshoot by the end of this decade. The International Energy Agency (IEA) finds that the fossil fuel sector accounts for nearly one-third of anthropogenic methane emissions today, and targeted methane mitigation in the sector could prevent a roughly 0.1°C rise in global temperatures by 2050. Most emissions can be addressed using existing technologies, often at no net cost due to the value of captured gas, with mitigation paying for itself many times over in avoided climate damages.
The EU Methane Regulation (EUMER) is the first legally binding standard to reduce fossil fuel methane emissions, and could reduce global oil and gas sector emissions by 30%. By 2030, it will phase in various measures affecting EU-produced oil, gas, and coal, as well as imported volumes, since the bloc imports most of its fossil fuels. Energy companies and industry associations have stated top-line support for the EUMER’s objectives, however, InfluenceMap has tracked an uptick in advocacy against the details of the regulation in 2025-26. By opposing the implementation of key policy measures already finalized by the Commission, this advocacy could undermine the regulation’s ability to deliver near-term emissions reductions and provide regulatory certainty for companies operating in or exporting to the EU.
From 2021 – 2026, InfluenceMap identified 276 publicly available pieces of evidence of corporate climate policy engagement with the EU Methane Regulation. These data sources include organizational website disclosures and social media channels, executive statements, financial disclosures, direct engagement with policymakers, and reliable media reporting. Of these 276 communications advocating on the EUMER by 54 entities within the LobbyMap database, Eurogas and IOGP Europe together represented 30% of them:
The next most engaged entity was the USLNG Association (LNG Allies), with 15 evidence pieces. The remaining 65% of communications were spread across the remaining 51 entities, made up predominantly of EU and US energy companies and associations.
Some renewables and utilities companies have historically offered strong support for the EUMER:
Yet positive advocacy on the EUMER is waning. InfluenceMap has identified only 2 corporate statements which are supportive of the file in 2025 (coming from Eurogas and Shell), and none so far in 2026. An absence of positive corporate advocacy risks reinforcing current industry narratives that underestimate the feasibility and benefits of effective methane regulation.
In their campaign to weaken the EUMER, oil and gas industry groups are deploying narratives that the file threatens energy security and competitiveness, whilst downplaying the feasibility of the finalized rule. These narratives misrepresent both the policy’s design and current market dynamics.
A common argument used by industry to advocate against the EUMER is that the regulation threatens the EU’s energy affordability and security. For example, a joint statement from IOGP Europe and FuelsEurope in March 2026 stated that “limited compliant volumes accessible to the EU market would be insufficient to meet demand, potentially triggering a significant supply gap, accompanied by severe market impacts.”
The IEA confirms that methane regulations can improve energy security and ease the supply-demand balance by bringing additional natural gas to market. The EUMER is designed to reduce methane gas waste in the oil and gas supply chain and improve operational efficiency, with specific safeguarding clauses ensuring that security of supply will never be affected by its provisions.
The regulation does not automatically ban fossil fuel imports in the event of non-compliance. Instead, Member States will implement “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” sanctions (e.g. penalty charges or fines) on non-compliant importing companies.
Furthermore, EU gas demand is in structural decline: an EU Agency analysis estimates that LNG supply from existing contracts will exceed demand as early as 2027. A December 2025 Rystad analysis on behalf of the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) projects that by 2027, global volumes of OGMP 2.0 Level 5 (EUMER-compliant) oil and gas will double the EU’s expected demand.
Similarly, fossil fuel groups have repeatedly framed the EUMER as a threat to competitiveness to justify weakening it under the EU’s wider simplification agenda: in December 2025, ten oil and gas associations called on the Commission to include the EUMER in an Omnibus to “safeguard industrial competitiveness.”
A coalition of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) finds that the extension of requirements to non-EU operators from 2027 prevents unfair competition between EU producers and external suppliers, with clear regulations establishing a level playing field.
A Rystad study revealed that importers are largely positioned to absorb penalties within existing profit margins, while investing to meet EUMER standards. An EDF-commissioned Carbon Limits study found that full compliance costs are modest compared to production value and normal market variability.
In attempts to delay implementation and push changes to the policy, industry groups emphasize a lack of regulatory clarity to suggest that EUMER obligations cannot realistically be met within policy deadlines. For example, in a March 2026 press release, the managing director of IOGP Europe stated that “what the Regulation asks for is simply not feasible in the mandated timeframe” and called for a “Stop-the-Clock mechanism to provide time for workable solutions through targeted adjustments.”
The CSO coalition reinforces that the EUMER explicitly allows for phased implementation, flexible methodologies to comply with obligations, and the development of model contractual clauses and Commission guidance, to address implementation challenges without weakening core obligations.
Consistent with the standard procedure for implementing EU energy and environmental legislation, outstanding technical details will be clarified through delegated and implementing acts.
For industries and countries that continue to rely on fossil gas, strong regulatory measures for methane abatement along the oil and gas supply chain remain essential to achieving international climate targets. Companies from across the gas value chain could take the lead with clear and public science-aligned positions in support of robust implementation of the EU Methane Regulation and ensure that trade association memberships and advocacy activities are aligned with stated methane-reduction commitments.
In line with guidance from the IPCC and the Global Standard on Responsible Climate Lobbying , investors are encouraged to engage with companies on their advocacy on the EU Methane Regulation. In aid of this, InfluenceMap’s Recommended Investor Asks provides a concise guide to engagement with companies in line with the recommendations outlined in the Global Standard on Responsible Climate Lobbying. Other resources to support investors that are offered by InfluenceMap include detailed 1-2-1 company calls and briefings and detailed investor notes to aid voting decisions on shareholder and management.
| Policy Measure | Company Positions | Industry Association Positions |
|---|---|---|
| Overall ambition of EU Methane Regulation | Conditional support, whilst emphasizing implementation based on cost-effectiveness and proportionality
Some broad unconditional support
| Consistent pressure for regulation to be included in an Omnibus “simplification” package
|
| Implementation timelines | Emphasizing concerns with timelines, citing lack of “regulatory clarity”
| Advocating for “stop-the-clock” mechanism to postpone deadlines
|
| Leak detection & repair (LDAR) requirements | Supporting need for LDAR, whilst seeking flexibility on acceptable technologies, methodologies, and inspection frequency
| Arguing LDAR requirements are not technologically feasible, pushing for exemptions for certain facilities and leaks
|
| Importer requirements:
Art. 27: Data reporting obligations Art. 28. Monitoring, reporting, & verification (MRV) equivalence Art. 29: Methane intensity reporting and standard | Calling for impact assessment, asking to link entry into force with publication of implementing acts
Asking that EU pursue outreach with third countries to establish MRV equivalence
Advocating for compliance pathways which could reduce the import standard’s methane reduction potential, and a pragmatic approach to establishing country-level MRV equivalence
| Advocating to delay entry into force until publication of implementing guidance
Advocating for compliance pathways which significantly reduce the import standard’s methane reduction potential Advocating for less stringent criteria to achieve company-level MRV equivalence
|
| Penalties | Advocating for a “grace period” until implementing acts are in place, with grandfathering of contracts signed in the interim
| Advocating for a “grace period” until implementing acts are in place, and grandfathering contracts signed in the interim
Advocating for broader security of supply exemptions in penalty regimes
|
