This briefing assesses the alignment of South Korea’s 11th Basic Plan for Electricity Supply and Demand (hereinafter, 11th Basic Plan) with climate science, as defined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recommendations. It also examines the corporate actors and engagement dynamics that influenced and shaped the development of the 11th Basic Plan. The analysis draws on publicly available information and is intended for investors, companies, and policymakers in South Korea and internationally.
South Korea’s 11th Basic Plan: In February 2025, South Korea announced the 11th Basic Plan, which prioritizes expanded nuclear generation and maintains a significant role for coal and liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the power mix through 2030, rather than outlining a pathway for a rapid shift to a renewables-dominated system. In November 2025, the government began preparing the 12th Basic Plan with an interim report expected in early 2026 and final adoption by the end of the year.
Analysis of Science Alignment: InfluenceMap’s research finds that South Korea’s 11th Basic Plan is significantly misaligned with the IPCC guidance on pathways to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels (hereafter referred to as Science-Based Policy). While South Korea has 2030 and 2050 greenhouse gas reduction targets and legislation covering renewable energy, power generation, and distribution, the 11th Basic Plan does not reflect Science-Based Policy and fails to set out a credible long-term transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy. Further details on how InfluenceMap interprets Science-Based Policy across different areas of activity are available on this landing page.
Power, Oil, and Gas Sector Influence on the 11th Basic Plan: InfluenceMap’s analysis of 646 corporate engagement data points from 2023-2025 related to the 11th Basic Plan and the energy transition finds that policy influence is concentrated among a small group of power and fossil fuel sector actors. Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) is the most active entity, advocating grid expansion to support renewables and nuclear power. However, KEPCO’s parallel support for both renewables and nuclear does not align with a renewables-led transition and is accompanied by limited engagement on the phase-out of unabated fossil fuels. Meanwhile, oil and gas companies emphasize cost and reliability concerns to justify continued investment in fossil fuels. Taken together, these engagement patterns weaken renewables-focused policy clarity and constrain the conditions necessary for a transition to predominantly renewables-based power systems.
Pro-renewable Voices Outweighed by Major Influencers: Renewable energy industry associations, including the Korea Photovoltaic Industry Association (KOPIA) and the Korea New and Renewable Energy Association (KNREA), consistently advocate for scaling up renewable deployment through stronger policy support and investment. However, their influence is outweighed by the power and influence of the fossil fuel sector actors noted above, as well as by larger cross-sector associations such as the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI) and the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI). These groups offer only conditional support for renewables, emphasize cost and reliability risks associated with a renewables-dominated power system, and promote continued expansion of nuclear power and LNG, thereby constraining progress toward a renewables-led transition.
Limited Demand-side Engagement in the Policy Process: Corporate engagement on South Korea’s 11th Basic Plan is dominated by the power and fossil fuel sectors. While central, these sectors represent only a narrow segment of the wider economy, which is driven mainly by services, manufacturing, and technology. InfluenceMap finds very limited public or direct engagement from demand-side sectors in the development of the 11th Basic Plan, despite their growing exposure to power system outcomes. This is notable given the scale of RE100 and other climate commitments made by major electricity users, such as Samsung Electronics, SK Group companies, and Hyundai Motor Group, all of which depend on clear, enabling power-sector policy. Instead, these firms are largely represented through cross-sector industry associations, including KCCI and FKI, which have not proactively advocated for a stronger role for renewable energy in the country’s energy mix.
Looking Ahead to the 12th Basic Plan: InfluenceMap’s research indicates that closer alignment with science-based pathways will depend on shifts in corporate engagement patterns, including clearer positions on fossil fuel phase-out, stronger and more coordinated advocacy from renewable energy providers, and greater participation from demand-side companies with climate commitments (e.g., Net Zero, RE100), alongside investor scrutiny to support clearer long-term power system signals.
Science-Based Policy (SBP) - The policies highlighted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to deliver the Paris Agreement’s goals of limiting global temperature rises to well below 2°C and towards 1.5°C. This includes specific technology and policy-level insights that are used by InfluenceMap analysis as Science-Based Policy Benchmarks. Further details on how InfluenceMap interprets Science-Based Policy across different areas of activity are available on this landing page.
Policy Engagement - In 2013, the UN issued a Guide for Responsible Corporate Engagement in Climate Policy, which describes a range of corporate activities that can be defined as policy engagement, including advertising and social media, as well as participation in policy advisory committees.
Basic Plan for Electricity Supply and Demand - South Korea’s power generation policy framework, a biennially updated 15-year outlook that forecasts national electricity demand and ensures a stable supply. It outlines the government’s strategies for electricity demand management, power mix and capacity planning, and power market restructuring.
South Korea’s national climate policy is anchored in the global framework established by the Paris Agreement, which aims to limit warming to well below 2°C and pursue efforts toward 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. South Korea ratified the Paris Agreement in 2016 and has since submitted and updated its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), committing to an economy-wide greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction of 40% by 2030 from 2018 levels and a long-term objective of carbon neutrality by 2050. To implement these commitments, South Korea has developed a domestic climate policy framework through successive national policy plans. Building on a broader policy framework established in 2018, the government announced the 1st Basic Plan for Carbon Neutrality and Green Growth in April 2023 as its highest-level climate policy instrument, setting sector-specific emissions targets, annual reduction pathways, and implementation measures across energy, technology, and structural transition. Within this framework, the 11th Basic Plan for Electricity Supply and Demand, released in February 2025, defines the future power mix and generation capacity required to meet emissions reduction objectives in the power sector. Under President Lee Jae-myeong, the current administration has further shaped climate governance priorities. The Lee administration frames climate change as an urgent, cross-sectoral challenge, with a policy agenda focused on expanding renewable energy, accelerating the phase-out of coal, strengthening centralized climate-energy governance, and strategically positioning nuclear power within the energy transition.
South Korea’s Basic Plan for Electricity Supply and Demand (hereinafter, the Basic Plan) is a mid- to long-term power policy framework updated biennially that forecasts electricity demand over a 15-year horizon and sets the power generation mix to ensure supply stability. It covers electricity demand management, generation and facility planning, and power market restructuring. In February 2025, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) released the finalized 11th Basic Plan, covering 2024–2038. The plan responds to carbon neutrality goals and to rising electricity demand driven by AI, semiconductors, and other sectors. Centered on nuclear power, the proposed power mix also includes renewable energy, hydrogen and ammonia, and fossil fuels such as coal and liquefied natural gas (LNG). To deliver this mix, the government plans to construct new nuclear and fossil gas-based generation facilities, including large-scale reactors and small modular reactors (SMRs), by 2038. Decisions on expanding hydrogen co-firing facilities and other technologies are expected to be elaborated in the forthcoming 12th Basic Plan, which began preparation in November 2025 and is scheduled for completion by the end of 2026.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the UN body providing scientific guidance on climate change, has repeatedly emphasized the urgent need for far-reaching action to limit global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Its 2018 Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C highlighted the need for transformational change across sectors, while the AR6 Synthesis Report, released in March 2023, underscored that current actions remain insufficient in both scale and pace. The report calls for substantial global GHG emissions reductions, supported by decisive, comprehensive policy measures and financing.
In this section, South Korea’s 11th Basic Plan is assessed against Science-Based Policy derived from IPCC guidance. Full details of the methodology and the IPCC benchmarks used in this assessment are provided in Appendix II. Key policy elements under the 11th Basic Plan are summarized below.
11th Basic Plan Misaligned with 1.5°C Trajectories: While the 11th Basic Plan aims to ensure electricity supply stability, strengthen energy security, and support carbon neutrality, its targets and measures appear to fall short of South Korea’s climate commitments and science-based pathways consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5°C. The Plan prioritizes nuclear expansion, maintains a significant role for coal and fossil gas, limits renewables deployment, and relies on uncertain future technologies. Rather than enabling the rapid shift to a renewables-dominated, zero-emissions power system emphasized by the IPCC, it adopts a gradual, technology-contingent approach that risks locking in emissions during this critical decade.
Overreliance on Nuclear Power: The 11th Basic Plan places heavy emphasis on nuclear power and is misaligned with Science-Based Policy, with nuclear projected to account for 31.8-35.2% of electricity generation between 2030 and 2038—more than double the global average in IPCC pathways (14.33% in 2030 and 8.10% in 2050). Continuing a shift that began under the 10th Basic Plan, South Korea prioritizes new nuclear capacity despite IPCC pathways indicating a declining global reliance on nuclear power due to high costs, long construction timelines, and public acceptance challenges. While nuclear energy can contribute to low-carbon electricity generation, the IPCC finds its role in the energy transition to be more limited than that of renewable technologies, with wind and solar expected to play the dominant role in achieving net-zero emissions globally.
Insufficient Renewable Energy Ambition: South Korea’s renewable energy targets under the 11th Basic Plan fall well short of levels required under IPCC-consistent 1.5°C pathways. Despite projected increases, renewables are expected to account for only 18.8-29.2% of the power mix between 2030 and 2038—far below the 53.6% average share in 1.5°C pathways and even below high-overshoot scenarios. As a result, the Plan lacks the ambition necessary to enable rapid, large-scale renewable deployment consistent with science-based recommendations.
Continued Reliance on Coal and LNG: The 11th Basic Plan signals continued reliance on coal and LNG at levels inconsistent with IPCC guidance, while deferring decarbonization to unproven future technologies. Projected coal and LNG shares between 2030 and 2038—particularly coal, which remains more than double the global average in IPCC pathways—exceed levels compatible with a 1.5°C trajectory. IPCC pathways indicate that, by 2030, global electricity generation shares will decline to approximately 7.28% for coal and 20.18% for fossil gas, falling further to near zero and 6.93%, respectively, by 2050. While the Plan includes coal plant retirements and conversions to gas, hydrogen, or ammonia, these technologies are not yet commercialized at scale, leaving decarbonization outcomes uncertain and prolonging fossil fuel use. This approach contradicts IPCC pathways that call for a rapid phase-down of coal and fossil gas between 2030 and 2050, with hydrogen playing a limited, sector-specific role—primarily in hard-to-abate sectors such as steel, chemicals, and segments of heavy transport—and no established guidance supporting the use of ammonia in the power sector.
*Science-Based Policy (SBP) - Policies highlighted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to deliver the Paris Agreement's goal of limiting global temperature rises to well below 2°C and towards 1.5°C. This includes specific technology and policy-level insights that are used by InfluenceMap analysis as Science-Based Policy Benchmarks.
**New Energy - South Korea defines "new energy" as energy produced by converting existing fossil fuels or by generating electricity or heat through chemical reactions involving substances such as hydrogen and oxygen. New energy includes hydrogen energy, fuel cells, energy derived from the liquefaction or gasification of coal, and energy produced through the gasification of heavy residual oil (the final residue remaining after crude oil refining).
To understand why South Korea’s 11th Basic Plan is misaligned with Science-Based Policy, it is necessary to examine the corporate sectors and entities that have influenced its development and are likely to shape its future trajectory. Real-economy companies play a significant role in South Korea’s industrial, energy, and climate policymaking, making corporate influence a key factor in understanding policy outcomes. The following analysis draws on InfluenceMap’s ongoing tracking of corporate engagement in climate and energy policy through its Korea Platform and focuses specifically on corporate influence related to the 11th Basic Plan.
Consistent with its methodology (see Appendix I), InfluenceMap tracks corporate and industry association engagement on climate policy and identifies evidence of engagement with South Korea’s 11th Basic Plan, as well as broader policy-relevant statements on the energy transition. InfluenceMap identified 25 evidence items from 2023 to 2025 reflecting direct engagement with South Korea’s 11th Basic Plan. These relate only to Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), Korea National Oil Corporation (KNOC), and Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS), indicating that direct engagement with the Basic Plan has been limited to a narrow group of power, oil, and gas entities, with little explicit input from other sectors.
Broader industry narratives have also shaped public discourse and policy outcomes. InfluenceMap analyzed 646 statements from the same period, revealing wider participation but frequent narrative inconsistencies. While many communications support expanding renewable energy, they are often coupled with advocacy for fossil fuels and concerns regarding a renewable-dominated power mix, thereby weakening policy coherence for South Korea’s long-term energy transition. Key industry engagement patterns shaping the 11th Basic Plan include:
KEPCO’s engagement on renewable energy has centered on the national power grid, emphasizing that infrastructure upgrades are essential to accommodate the renewable generation targets in the 11th Basic Plan. Simultaneously, KEPCO has supported maintaining nuclear power levels as a stable baseload resource, yet has not framed this within a broader commitment to phasing out unabated fossil fuels or transitioning toward a predominantly renewables-based system.
Oil and gas companies, particularly KNOC and KOGAS, have played a constraining role in the 11th Basic Plan discussions by advocating for a continued presence of fossil fuels. They argue that rapid renewable expansion could increase electricity prices and strain the power system, using this narrative to justify ongoing fossil gas development as essential for affordability and supply stability.
Cross-sector industry associations, most prominently FKI, generally expressed skepticism toward a renewables-dominated energy mix, stating that increased reliance on variable renewable energy would make expansion of LNG capacity “inevitable” to preserve system reliability.
Across South Korea’s energy transition debate, industry engagement has concentrated primarily on renewables and hydrogen, but these discussions often fall short of IPCC guidance calling for a rapid shift to a renewables-dominated energy mix and the phase-out of unabated fossil fuels.
| Energy | Who is Engaging and What are the Positions? |
|---|---|
| Fossil Fuels | Coal and gas remain the incumbent sources of electricity generation in South Korea, together accounting for around 60% of total power generation as of 2024. This reflects a large, established fleet of coal- and gas-fired power plants and associated infrastructure, which represents the part of the power system that must be transformed if renewables or other low-carbon sources are to replace fossil generation in line with climate science. Corporate engagement on the transition away from fossil fuels is dominated by oil and gas companies, along with power and utility companies, particularly KEPCO and KNOC, which are the most active and influential actors shaping electricity policy. Engagement has largely focused on sustaining the role of coal and gas rather than setting out pathways for the phase-out of unabated use. KNOC and KOGAS have advocated for new exploration and infrastructure investment, invoking energy security and affordability to justify their positions, while KEPCO has promoted measures such as ammonia co-firing to reduce emissions from coal generation, without clear commitments on coal phase-out timelines or the decarbonization of fuel supply. Taken together, these positions reinforce the continued centrality of coal and gas in the power system rather than signalling the shift required under IPCC-aligned pathways. |
| Renewables | Industry engagement has focused heavily on renewable energy, often supporting its expansion in principle while stopping short of framing it as a transition toward a renewables-dominated power system. Engagement is dominated by Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) and fossil fuel sector actors, which are by far the most active and influential voices in the policy debate. KEPCO emphasizes grid reinforcement but does not clearly endorse a predominantly renewables-based energy mix, while fossil fuel companies frame renewables growth around cost and reliability constraints. This supply-side dominance is notable given that demand-side sectors, including the technology and manufacturing industries that drive South Korea’s economy, have remained largely absent from direct engagement on the need for a renewables-dominated energy mix. Despite major electricity users committing to RE100, their specific needs for enabling power policy are often overshadowed by the more negative positions of the cross-sector groups that represent them. Renewable industry associations such as the Korea Photovoltaic Industry Association (KOPIA) and the Korea New and Renewable Energy Association (KNREA) lead calls for the investment and policy reforms needed to rapidly scale deployment, but their influence is outweighed by larger power, fossil fuel, and cross-sector groups. Cross-sector associations, including the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI) and the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), express broad support for renewables while highlighting cost and energy security risks associated with a renewables-dominated system. Taken together, these dynamics support renewables in principle but, in practice, constrain a full renewables-led transition. |
| Nuclear | Corporate and industry engagement has largely supported maintaining or expanding nuclear power, but provides limited clarity on how nuclear fits within South Korea’s long-term energy transition. KEPCO consistently promotes nuclear energy on grounds of supply stability, without clearly indicating whether this position supports a renewables-led transition or the phase-out of unabated fossil fuels. Cross-sector associations such as KCCI and FKI frame nuclear power as a central long-term option and, at times, present it as an alternative to large-scale renewable deployment. Similarly, companies including POSCO and Doosan Enerbility express support for nuclear expansion while leaving unresolved the role of fossil fuel phase-out and the pathway to a predominantly zero-emissions energy system. |
| Hydrogen | Corporate and industry engagement has broadly supported the expansion of hydrogen as a future energy and industrial solution, but has paid limited attention to decarbonizing hydrogen production. KEPCO, H2KOREA, and SK Innovation E&S have generally promoted hydrogen development and infrastructure without clearly distinguishing between fossil-based and renewable production pathways. KCCI has not addressed production decarbonization and has at times appeared open to hydrogen derived from fossil fuels, while KOGAS has promoted hydrogen blending with fossil gas as a transitional measure. Overall, the dominant narrative positions hydrogen as a growth area but does not consistently prioritize alignment with zero-emissions production pathways. |
The findings in this briefing underscore that the trajectory of South Korea’s electricity planning will depend not only on policy design but also on whether corporate and industry engagement patterns evolve during the development of the 12th Basic Plan.
Corporate engagement in power planning remains highly concentrated among incumbent power and fossil fuel actors. A more diversified and balanced engagement landscape will be critical if future plans, including the 12th Basic Plan, are to support a credible transition pathway.
Clearer and more consistent positions on end-state power system design are needed. This includes greater transparency regarding the scale and pace of renewable deployment, explicit trajectories for reducing reliance on coal and fossil gas, and clearly defined roles for nuclear and transitional technologies such as hydrogen and ammonia.
Stronger, more coordinated policy engagement from renewable energy providers could help address system integration, cost, and reliability questions that currently shape the policy debate, thereby improving confidence in a renewables-dominated power system.
Demand-side actors—particularly large electricity users with decarbonization and RE100 commitments—remain underrepresented in the policy process. More active participation from these companies could strengthen demand signals for clean power and support enabling policy and market reforms.
Engagement from major cross-sector business associations, including the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI) and the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), remains cautious toward strong renewables-led policy, despite representing major electricity users such as Samsung Electronics, Hyundai Motor Group, and SK Group companies. Clearer and more proactive support from these associations could play an important role in aligning power sector reform with the decarbonization objectives of their member companies.
