In July, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry opened public consultations on two energy security proposals: the “Draft Summary of Issues on Structural Responses for Securing a Stable Supply of Resources and Energy in Light of the International Situation” (until August 22) and revisions to the Long-Term Decarbonized Power Source Auction (until August 16). Amid the Strait of Hormuz energy crisis, both proposals rely heavily on fossil fuels to strengthen Japan’s energy security, while placing comparatively less emphasis on scaling up clean energy.
InfluenceMap’s new research finds that, since the crisis, Japanese heavy-industry corporate voices have increasingly emphasized fossil-fuel-based energy security measures. The research analyzes how Japan’s heavy industry has shaped the country’s fossil-fuel-led energy mix to date, and how the current crisis could be an opportunity for industry and policymakers to shift toward a renewable-led energy mix that is resilient to global disruptions.
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz disrupted roughly 20% of global oil and LNG supply, in what the International Energy Agency (IEA) has characterized as the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market.
Japan is particularly exposed to such disruptions, with approximately 95% of its crude oil imports originating from the Middle East, according to the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). While around 10% of Japan's LNG imports come directly from the region, oil-indexed LNG contracts and tight global LNG markets are expected to increase fuel costs and electricity prices for Japan. The Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI) estimated that rising oil prices could push household electricity prices up by ¥2.1–5/kWh, while Toshihiro Nagahama, Executive Chief Economist at Dai-ichi Life Research Institute, projected that household electricity and gas bills would increase by around ¥15,000 a year if crude oil prices remain elevated.
The disruption has already prompted emergency measures in Japan. The government has temporarily lifted restrictions on coal-fired power plant operation to reduce the risk of an energy shortage, and METI announced the release of oil from Japan’s national emergency reserves on March 16, March 24, and April 15.
Japan's energy policy has long been guided by the "3E+S" framework—balancing Energy Security, Economic Efficiency, Environment, and Safety. The framework emerged following the oil shocks triggered by conflict in the Middle East during the 1970s, when oil accounted for around 76% of Japan's primary energy supply and was sourced predominantly from the region. Since then, Japan has significantly reduced oil's share of its energy mix by diversifying into LNG, coal, and nuclear power, but around 80% of its primary energy supply still comes from imported fossil fuels. According to the Japan Climate Leaders’ Partnership, Japan spends JPY 25 trillion annually on fossil fuel imports even in normal times, and this outflow of national wealth expands further with every crisis.
The crisis raises a broader question: after five decades of energy security policy, why does Japan remain dependent on imported fossil fuels and vulnerable to global disruptions to the fossil fuel market?
Japan’s energy policy is primarily decided by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, with limited input from other ministries and sign-off by the Cabinet Office. METI relies heavily on corporate and industry input for its decision-making on energy and industrial policy: InfluenceMap’s research finds the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) and some of its key members play a dominant role in this process.
InfluenceMap’s research consistently reveals alignment between heavy industry advocacy and Japanese government policymaking. In the past, government officials appeared to echo narratives used by Japanese heavy industry in their own messaging: the Japanese Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE) Director-General stated that LNG plays an "important role" in pursuing net zero and referenced the industry-authored "Hiroshima Statement"; in a separate interview, the ANRE Director-General commented that resolving Japan's energy challenges solely through renewable energy would be difficult.
InfluenceMap's analysis also found substantial alignment between positions advanced by heavy industry actors—including Mitsubishi Corporation, Tokyo Gas, the Japan Gas Association (JGA), and the Japan Energy Resources Development Association (JERDA)— and the final language adopted in Japan's 7th Strategic Energy Plan. The plan maintains a 30–40% share of thermal power generation through 2040, reinforces LNG as a long-term fuel, and supports continued LNG investment and overseas resale. Following its publication, several energy companies and associations praised the plan, with some stating that their recommendations had been reflected in the final outcome.
InfluenceMap’s analysis shows that strategic and influential policy engagement is concentrated among a relatively small number of companies and associations representing heavy industry sectors, particularly steel, electric power, automobiles, oil and gas, coal, hydrogen, and industrial machinery. These sectors have a disproportionate presence on key climate-related government committees—including METI’s Strategic Energy Plan Committee and the Green Transformation (GX) Implementation Council. By contrast, demand-side sectors—retail, pharmaceuticals, electronics, communications, and finance—represent around 70% of Japan's economy, yet they are only moderately engaged on climate and energy policy and remain relatively underrepresented on key METI advisory committees.
InfluenceMap’s research has repeatedly uncovered this pattern of heavy industry influence over government climate policymaking:
In June 2025, InfluenceMap’s analysis of the electric power industry illustrated the sector’s strong representation through Keidanren, industry associations such as the Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPC), and prominent energy think tanks at which executives from major utilities frequently hold leadership positions.
In February 2026, InfluenceMap’s analysis of 13 Japanese companies with investments in Australian LNG found that these companies and their industry associations held 69 seats across Japan's key METI energy committees.
Disclaimer: Figure 2 provides a simplified version of the committee structure and committee membership for illustrative purposes.
Corporate communications and narratives directed at policymakers, the media, and the general public represent a core part of corporate policy engagement strategy. They set the scene for engagement with regulators over the details of regulation, policy, and government guidance. Narrative assessment forms an important part of InfluenceMap's research. InfluenceMap analyzed messaging by Japanese heavy industries before and after the Strait of Hormuz energy crisis.
InfluenceMap’s July 2024 Fossil Fuel Narrative Playbook identified three core narratives that fossil fuel industry actors rely on in their climate and energy policy advocacy, including “Solution Skepticism.” This narrative questions the feasibility or sufficiency of alternatives while promoting fossil fuels as climate “solutions,” thereby weakening support for a more rapid shift toward proven decarbonization technologies such as renewable energy. A February 2026 analysis of 16 Japanese oil and gas companies and associations found that “Solution Skepticism” accounted for 76% of all fossil fuel narratives used since 2022.
After the Strait of Hormuz energy crisis began in February 2026, heavy industry representatives dominated public corporate engagement, increasingly emphasizing fossil-fuel-based energy security measures. This included calls to restart idle coal-fired power plants in Japan and expand overseas gas production. By contrast, InfluenceMap identified limited evidence of corporate advocacy in support of clean energy in Japan following the Strait of Hormuz energy crisis.
| Technology | Narrative Example Since the Strait of Hormuz Energy Crisis |
|---|---|
| Coal | Japanese power companies and their industry associations consistently invoked energy security to advocate for the continued or expanded use of coal-fired power, while omitting or leaving unclear accompanying emissions abatement measures.
In a Bloomberg article published on March 14, JERA Global CEO and Chair Kani stated that ”should the situation in Iran drag on, the whole of Japan would need to implement measures such as bringing other power sources—including coal—online and promoting energy conservation,” without commenting on the need for emissions abatement. At a press conference on March 27, JGA Chairman Uchida stated that, in a crisis situation, utilizing low-efficiency coal-fired power is a “natural option,” without mentioning the need for emissions abatement measures such as carbon capture and storage. At the same time, he noted that in the future, it would be necessary to rely more on nuclear, renewables, and energy conservation. In a METI committee meeting on March 27, the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) supported temporarily lifting the restrictions imposed on coal-fired power generation, claiming that coal “is expected to continue playing a specific role as a power source for the foreseeable future.” It also appeared to request government support to address the “upward pressure” of gas and oil prices on electricity tariffs. At a press conference on June 24, JERA President, Director, CEO, and COO Okuda stated that “we place great importance on the fact that coal-fired power is resilient to geopolitical risks.” While Okuda also mentioned that “we will not neglect decarbonization measures” such as “transition to ammonia as a fuel and the use of CCS,” the timeline for decarbonization remains unclear. In a Nikkei article published on June 25, amid the Strait of Hormuz energy crisis, J-Power CEO Kato stated that the company’s “commitment to redirecting investment towards renewable energy and nuclear power remains unchanged,” but that “with a view to ensuring a stable supply, we must simultaneously consider utilizing existing coal-fired power stations for as long as possible.” |
| Gas | Japanese oil and gas companies cited energy security to advocate for new LNG investment, framing continued gas expansion as essential to regional supply stability.
In a position paper submitted to the Parliament of Australia on April 15, INPEX emphasized the strategic importance of Australian LNG, citing the Middle East crisis, and claimed that new investment in LNG supports energy security in Japan, Australia, Taiwan, and the wider APAC region. |
| Renewables & Low-Carbon Technology | InfluenceMap found limited evidence of corporate advocacy for renewables and low-carbon technologies, with one exception in which Japanese demand-side companies referenced the cost of fossil fuel imports to argue for accelerating demand-side efficiency and domestic renewables.
In a position paper published on July 30, the Japan Climate Leaders’ Partnership (JCLP) emphasized the JPY 25 trillion Japan spends annually on fossil fuel imports and called for reduced reliance on fossil fuels. It proposed five priority measures: improving building insulation, expanding zero-emission vehicles and charging infrastructure, accelerating rooftop solar, developing floating offshore wind power generation, and strengthening the electricity grid. |
Amid this corporate advocacy, METI's fossil-fuel-focused subcommittees are discussing Japan’s response to the crisis. On July 24, the Subcommittee on Resources and Fuels released its "Draft Summary of Issues on Structural Responses for Securing a Stable Supply of Resources and Energy in Light of the International Situation," on which it is soliciting public consultation until August 22. Emphasizing the need to ensure a stable energy supply, the draft appears to set out measures—such as diversifying fossil fuel procurement sources and securing transport routes—that would entail the continued use of fossil fuels. This appears to mirror demands made by Japan’s heavy industry sectors. The draft includes a "non-fossil" energy section, but its recommendations focus on biofuel procurement and carbon capture, failing to mention the need to scale renewable energy and energy storage.
Separately, on July 17, METI’s Agency for Natural Resources and Energy opened a public consultation on proposed revisions to the fourth round of the Long-Term Decarbonized Power Source Auction, which runs until August 16.
In its response, Kiko Network highlighted that the proposal would support 6 GW of new LNG-fired power capacity in FY2026 and up to 55 GW over the following seven years, alongside increased and longer-term support for LNG power. By comparison, it proposed capping the procurement of battery storage, pumped hydro, and long-duration energy storage at a combined 1.2 GW in the fourth round.
The 3E+S framework has always been broad enough to support a renewables-led energy system, and a number of progressive corporate groups have argued this. Advocacy by the progressive business coalition, Renewable Energy Association for Sustainable Power Supply (REASP), for example, indicates a growing recognition that renewable energy systems could effectively support Japan’s “3E+S.” This view is shared by the climate progress-oriented part of corporate Japan. Japan Climate Leaders’ Partnership has called for renewables to account for at least 60% of Japan’s energy mix by 2035, while the Japan Climate Initiative has proposed 65–80%. Together, JCLP’s and JCI’s corporate members—including Ricoh, Takeda Pharmaceuticals, Sony, and Softbank—represent roughly 35% of the value of the Nikkei 225 stock market index as of October 2025, yet they are underrepresented on the METI subcommittees dominated by fossil fuel interests.
METI’s analysis from December 2024 shows that renewables are becoming increasingly competitive with thermal power, particularly in scenarios that rely on ammonia, hydrogen, and CCS in 2040. More recently, according to a March 2026 analysis from the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA), at current LNG prices, the levelized cost of electricity from gas-fired power in Asia is 3–4 times the global average for solar and wind. IEEFA estimates that every 1 GW of solar capacity could avoid USD 3 billion in LNG import costs over 25 years. Further analysis by IEEFA and Superpower Institute suggests that achieving net-zero targets could attract up to USD 6.7 trillion in investments, fueling innovation, job creation, and regional economic revitalization. As mentioned above, in July 2026, citing Japan’s massive fossil fuel import bill, JCLP called on the government to place energy efficiency, electrification, and expanded domestic renewables at the center of its energy package, framing these as investments in domestic industry.
Amid these shifts, industry and policymakers have an opportunity to reconsider the long-term role of fossil fuels in Japan’s energy future. With the respective consultation periods on METI's proposals open until August 16 and August 22, Japanese industry actors have an opportunity to promote energy pathways that would deliver energy security, economic efficiency, and decarbonization.
